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Abstract
We present a formally deterministic representation for quantum his-
tory theories where we obtain the probabilistic structure via a discrete
contextual variable: no continuous probabilities are as such involved at the
primal level — we conceive as a history theory any theory that deals with
sequential quantum measurements but remains essentially a dichotomic
propositional theory. A major part of the paper consists of a concise
survey of arXiv: quant-ph/0008061 and quant-ph/0008062 .
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we propose and study a model for history theories in which the
probability structure emerges from a finite number of contextual happenings,
any next happening having a fixed chance to occur under the condition that the
previous one happened. Although this model cannot have a canonical math-
ematical status since it has been proved that this type of representation in
general admits no essentially unique “smallest one” [8]ii, it provides insight in
the emergence of logicality in the “History Projection Operator” setting [14],
and it illustrates how deterministic behavior can be encoded beyond those in-
terpretations of quantum history theories that are interpretationally restricted
by so-called consistency or quasi-consistency (e.g., approximate decoherence).
The particular motivation for this “paradigm case study” finds its origin in
structural considerations towards a theory of quantum gravity [4, 15, 19]. As
argued in [16], although the relative frequency interpretation of probability jus-
tifies the continuous interval as the codomain for value assignment, “... in the
quantum gravity regime standard ideas of space and time might break down
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in such a way that the idea of spatial or temporal ‘ensembles’ is inappropri-
ate. For the other main interpretations of probability — subjective, logical, or
propensity — there seems to be no compelling a priori reason why probabilities
should be real numbers.” Our model should be envisioned as a deconstructive
step unraveling the probabilistic continuum as it appears in standard quantum
theory, reducing it explicitly to a discrete temporal sequence of (contextual)
events. The as such emerging temporal sequence is then easier to manipulate
towards alternative encoding of contextual events, e.g., in propositional terms.
It also enables a separate treatment of internal (the system’s) and external (the
context’s) time-encoding variable.
Although quantum history theories are currently most frequently envisioned
in a context of so-called decoherence we prefer to take the minimal perspec-
tive that a history theory is a theory that deals with sequential quantum mea-
surements but remains essentially a dichotomic propositional theory. This is
formally encoded in a rigid way in the History Projection Operator-approach
[14]. We also mention recently studied sequential structures in the context of
quantum logic, of which references can be found in [10], resulting in a dynamic
disjunctive quantum logic, which provides an appropriate formal context to dis-
cuss the logicality of history theories.
A general theory on deterministic contextual models can be found in [8].
Note here that what we consider as contextuality is that in a measurement
there is an interaction between the system and its context and that precisely this
interaction to some extend may influence the outcome of a measurement. A lack
of knowledge on the precise interaction then yields quantum-type uncertainties
[1]. Besides this interpretational issue, classical representations are important
since we think classical, so even without giving any conceptual significance to
the representation, it provides a mode to think deterministically in terms of
determined trajectories of the system’s state, without having to reconcile with
concrete non-canonical constructs like pilot-wave mechanics.
2 OUTCOME DETERMINATION VIA CONTEXTUAL
MODELS
We will present the required results in full abstraction such that the reader
clearly sees which structural ingredient of quantum theory determines existence
of contextual models. For details and proofs we refer to [8]. Let B(Rν) denote
the Borel subsets of Rν .
Definition 1. A ‘probabilistic measurement system’ is given by :
(i) A set of states Σ and a set of measurements E ;
(ii) For each e ∈ E an outcome set Oe ∈ B(R
ν) , a σ-field B(Oe) of Oe-subsets
and (Kolmogorovian) probability measures Pp,e : B(Oe)→ [0, 1] for each p ∈ Σ .
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The canonical example is that of quantum theory with every Hilbert space ray ψ
representing a state, every self-adjoint operator H representing a measurement
with its spectrum OH ⊆ R as outcome set where the σ-structure B(OH) is in-
herited from that of B(R) and with probability measures Pψ,H(E) := 〈ψ|PEψ〉
where PE denotes the spectral projector for E ∈ B(OH) . In benefit of insight
and also for notational convenience we will from now on assume that the mea-
surements e ∈ E are represented in a one to one way by their outcome sets Oe
— note that whenever E can be represented by points of Rν
′
it then suffices
to consider Rν × Rν
′
= Rν+ν
′
in stead of Rν to fulfill this assumption, taking
Oe × {e} as the corresponding outcome set. We stress however that the results
listed below also hold in absence of this assumption [8]i,ii.
Definition 2. A ‘pre-probabilistic hidden measurement system’ is given by :
(i) A set of states Σ and a set of measurements E ;
(ii) Sets O ⊆ B(Rν) and Λ that parameterize E , i.e., E = {eλ,O|λ ∈ Λ, O ∈ O} ,
and each e ∈ E goes equipped with a map ϕλ,O : Σ→ O .
We can represent {ϕλ,O|λ ∈ Λ} as ϕO : Σ × Λ → O : (p, λ) 7→ ϕλ,O(p) giving
Λ a similar formal status as the set of states Σ , or as ∆ΛO : Σ × B(O) →
P(Σ) : (p,E) 7→ {λ|ϕO(p, λ) ∈ E} where P(Λ) denotes the set of subsets of Λ .
The core of this definition is that given a state p ∈ Σ and a value λ ∈ Λ we
have a completely determined outcome ϕO(p, λ) . These pre-probabilistic hidden
measurement systems encode as such fully deterministic settings.
Definition 3. Whenever for a given pre-probabilistic hidden measurement sys-
tem
(
Σ, E(O,Λ), {ϕO}O∈O
)
there exists a σ-field B(Λ) of Λ-subsets that satisfies⋃
O∈O{∆ΛO(p,E)|(p,E) ∈ Σ×B(O)} ⊆ B(Λ), it defines a ‘probabilistic hidden
measurement system’ if a probability measure µ : B(Λ)→ [0, 1] is also specified.
The condition on ∆Λ requires that all ∆ΛO(p,E) are B(Λ)-measurable, such
that to all triples (p,O,E) we can assign a value Pp,O(E) := µ
(
∆ΛO(p,E)
)
∈
[0, 1] . As such, any probabilistic hidden measurement system defines a measure-
ment system. The question then rises whether every probabilistic measurement
system (MS) can be encoded as a probabilistic hidden measurement system
(HMS). The answer to this question is yes [8]i, §4.2, Theorem 1,2 & 3 : There
always exists a canonical HMS-representation for Λ ∼= [0, 1] , B(Λ) ∼= B([0, 1])
(i.e., the Borel sets in [0, 1] ) and µu([0, a]) := a , i.e., uniformly distributed —
the proof goes via a construction using the Loomis-Sikorski Theorem [17, 20]
and Marczewski’s Lemma [13]. It makes as such sense to investigate how
the different possible HMS-representations for different non-isomorphic pairs(
B(Λ), µ
)
are structured — below it will become clear what we mean here by
non-isomorphic. First we will discuss an example that illustrates the above ; it
traces back to [1] and details and illustrations can be found in [2, 8]ii . Con-
sider the states of a spin- 12 entity encoded as a point on the Poincare´ sphere
Σ◦(∼= C
2/C) ⊆ R3 . Then any pair of antipodically located points of Σ◦ encodes
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mutual orthogonal states, as such encodes mutual orthogonal one-dimensional
projectors and thus a (dichotomic) measurement. Let p ∈ Σ◦ , let (α,¬α) be
a pair of mutual orthogonal points of Σ◦ and let Λ be the diagonal connect-
ing α and ¬α . Let xp ∈ Λ be the orthogonal projection of p on the diago-
nal Λ . Then, for λ ∈ [xp,¬α] , i.e., xp ∈ [α, λ] , we set ϕ(p, λ) = α and for
λ ∈ [α, xp[ , i.e., xp ∈]λ,¬α] , we set ϕ(p, λ) = ¬α . One then verifies that for
µ◦ := B([α,¬α])→ [0, 1] : [α, (1 − x)α + x¬α] 7→ x , i.e., uniformly distributed,
we obtain exactly the probability structure for spin- 12 in quantum theory .
1 An
interpretational proposal of this model could be the following:[1, 2, 3] Rather
than decomposing states as in so-called hidden variable theories, here we de-
compose the measurements in deterministic ones — the probability measure µ
should then be envisioned as encoding the lack of knowledge on the interaction
of the measured system with its environment, including measurement device.
We now introduce a notion of “relative size” of HMS-representations, jus-
tifying the use of “smaller”. Given a σ-algebra 2 and probability measure
µ : B → [0, 1] denote by B/µ the σ-algebra of equivalence classes [E] with
respect to the relation E ∼ E′ ⇔ µ(E′ ∩ Ec) = µ(E ∩ E′c) = 0 , i.e., iff E and
E′ coincide up to a symmetric difference of measure zero . The ordering of B/µ
is inherited from B . For notational convenience denote the induced measure
B/µ → [0, 1] : [E] 7→ µ(E) again by µ . Given two pairs (B, µ) and (B′, µ′)
consisting of separable σ-algebras and probability measures on them set :
• (B, µ) ≤ (B′, µ′)⇔
{
∃f : B/µ→ B′/µ′ , an injective σ-morphism
µ′ ◦ f = µ
We call (B, µ) and (B′, µ′) equivalent, denoted (B, µ) ∼ (B′, µ′) , whenever in
the above f is a σ-isomorphism. Given two MS (Σ, E) and (Σ′, E ′) we set :
• (Σ, E) ∼
MS
(Σ′, E ′)⇔


∃s : Σ→ Σ′ , ∃t : E → E ′ , both bijections
∀e ∈ E , ∃fe : B(Oe)→ B(Ot(e)) , a σ-isomorphism
∀p ∈ Σ, ∀e ∈ E : Ps(p),t(e) ◦ fe = Pp,e
Via this equivalence relation we can define a relation ≤
MS
between classes of
measurement systems M and M′ as M ≤
MS
M′ if for all (Σ, E) ∈ M there
exists (Σ′, E ′) ∈ M′ such that (Σ, E) ∼
MS
(Σ′, E ′) , i.e., if M is included in M′
up to MS-equivalence. We can then prove the following :
(i) (B, µ) ∼ (B′, µ′) if and only if (B, µ) ≤ (B′, µ′) and (B′, µ′) ≤ (B, µ) —
[8]ii, §3, Lemma 1 ; thus, the equivalence classes with respect to ∼ constitute a
partially ordered set (poset) for the ordering induced by ≤ ; we will denote the
1As shown in [6, 9] this deterministic model for spin- 1
2
in R3 can be generalized to R3-
models for arbitrary spin-N/2 . The states are then represented in the so called Majorana
representation [18, 5], i.e., as N copies of Σ◦ . Correct probabilistic behavior is then obtained
by introducing entanglement between the N different “spin- 1
2
systems”.
2I.e., a “pointless” σ-field. In particular, it follows from the Loomis-Sikorski theorem
[17, 20] that all separable σ-algebras (i.e., which contain a countable dense subset) can be
represented as a σ-field — it as such also follows that assuming that B(Λ) is a σ-field and not
an abstracted σ-algebra imposes no formal restriction.
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set of these equivalence classes byM , a class in it will be denoted via a member
of it as [B, µ] .
(ii) When setting M
HMS
:=
{
M[B(Λ), µ]
∣∣ [B(Λ), µ] ∈ M} where M[B(Λ), µ]
stands for all HMS with B(Λ′) and µ′ such that (B′(Λ′), µ′) ∈ [B(Λ), µ] , we have
that (B(Λ), µ) ≤ (B′(Λ′), µ′) and M[B(Λ), µ] ≤
MS
M[B′(Λ′), µ′] are equivalent
[8]ii, §3, Theorem 2 . This then results in :
Theorem 1. (M,≤) and (M
HMS
,≤
MS
) are isomorphic posets.
One of the crucial ingredients in (ii) above and also in the proof for gen-
eral existence with Λ ∼= [0, 1] is the following: when setting ∆M(Σ, E) :=
{(B(Oe), Pp,e)|p ∈ Σ, e ∈ E} , we obtain that Σ, E admits a HMS-representation
with B(Λ) and µ if and only if ∆M(Σ, E) ≤ (B(Λ), µ) , where the order applies
pointwisely to the elements of ∆M(Σ, E) [8]i, §4.2, Theorem 1 . Using this and
Theorem 1 above we can now translate properties of M to propositions on the
existence of certain HMS-representations. We obtain the following :
(i) (M,≤) is not a join-semilattice, thus : In general there exists no smallest
HMS-representation. As such we will have to refine our study to particular
settings where we are able to make statements whether there exists a smallest
one, and if not, whether we can say at least something on the cardinality of Λ.
(ii) One can prove a number of criteria on ∆M(Σ, E) that force (B(Λ), µ) ∼(
B([0, 1]), µu
)
as such assuring existence of a smallest representation. Among
these the following. LetMfinite :=
{(
B(X), µ
)
∈M
∣∣ X is finite} . IfMfinite ⊆
∆M(Σ, E) than Λ cannot be discrete. It then follows for example that quantum
theory restricted to measurements with a finite number of outcomes still requires
Λ ∼= [0, 1] .
(iii) LetMN :=
{(
B(X), µ
)
∈M
∣∣ X has at mostN elements} . If ∆M(Σ, E) ⊆
MN then there exists a HMS-representation with Λ ∼= N . Thus, quantum theory
restricted to those measurements with at most a fixed number N of outcomes
has discrete HMS-representation.
(iv) If ∆M(Σ, E) =MN then there exists no smallest HMS-representation. Nei-
ther does it exist when fixing the number of outcomes. So there is no essentially
unique smallest HMS-representation for N -outcome quantum theory.
Although there exists no smallest and as such no canonical discrete HMS-
representation we will give the construction of one solution for dichotomic (or
propositional) quantum theory, i.e., N = 2 , since this will constitute the core
of the model presented in this paper. We will follow [8]iii, to which we also
refer for a construction for arbitrary N . Let us denote the quantum mechanical
probability to obtain a positive outcome in a measurement of a proposition or
question α on a system in state p as Pp(α) — the outcome set consists here of
“we obtain a positive answer for the question α”, slightly abusively denoted as
α itself, and “we obtain a negative answer for the question α”, denoted as ¬α .
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Set inductively for λ ∈ N : 3
• ϕα(p, λ) :=
{
α iff Pp(α) ≥
1
2λ +
∑λ−1
i=1
δ(ϕα(p,i),α)
2i
¬α otherwise
One verifies that for µ(λ) := 1
2λ
we obtain the correct probabilities in the re-
sulting HMS-model. This provides a discrete alternative for the above discussed
R3-model for spin- 12 . The model, including the projection xp remains the same
although we don’t consider [α,¬α] as Λ anymore. Let λ ∈ Λ′ := N . Set xλn :=(
1− n
2λ
)
α +
(
n
2λ
)
¬α for n ∈ Z2λ−1 . For xp ∈ [α, x
λ
1 [∪[x
λ
2 , x
λ
3 [∪[x
λ
4 , x
λ
5 [∪ . . . ∪
[xλ2λ−1,¬α] we set ϕ
′
α(p, λ) = α , and ϕ
′
α(p, λ) = ¬α otherwise. Then, for
µ′◦ := B(N) → [0, 1] : {λ} 7→
1
2λ
we obtain again quantum probability . Ge-
ometrically, this means that the values of λ ∈ Λ , as compared to the first
model where they represents points on the diagonal, i.e., a continuous interval,
or, again equivalently, decompositions of an interval in two intervals, we now
consider decompositions of an interval in 2λ equally long parts, of which there
are only a discrete number of possibilities . We refer to [8]ii for details and
illustrations concerning.
3 UNITARY, ORTHO- AND PROJECTIVE STRUCTURE
In the above discussed R3 models, rotational symmetries where implicit in their
spatial geometry. However, in general the decompositions of measurements over
µ : B(Λ) → [0, 1] go measurement by measurement so additional structure, if
there is any, has to be put in by hand. It is probably fair to say that these
contextual models only become non-trivial and useful when encoding physical
symmetries within the maps ϕα in an appropriate manner . For sake of the
argument we will distinguish between three types of symmetries that can be
encoded, namely unitary, ortho- and projective ones.
i. Unitary symmetries : When considering quantum measurements with dis-
crete non-degenerated spectrum we can represent the outcomes {oi}i by the
corresponding “eigenstates” {pi}i via spectral decomposition, i.e., there ex-
ists an injective map B(Oe) → P(Σ) for each e ∈ E . Then, specification of
ϕ : Σ×Λ→ {pi}i and µ for one measurement e0 ∈ E fixes it for any other e ∈ E
by symmetry: ϕe = (U ◦ ϕ ◦ U
−1) : Λ × Σ → {pe,i}i , where U : Σ → Σ is the
unitary transformation that satisfies U(pi) = pe,i , and µe = µ . This is exactly
the symmetry encoded in the above described R3-models . Note in particular
that in this perspective the pairs (α,¬α) and
(
¬α,¬(¬α)
)
should not be envi-
sioned as merely a change of names of the outcomes, but truly as putting the
3We agree on N := {1, 2, . . .} . Note here that already by non-uniqueness of binary decom-
position — 1
2
= 1
21
=
∑
i∈N
1
2i+1
— it follows that the construction below is not canonical.
Obviously, there are also less pathological differences between the different non-comparable
discrete representations [8]ii.
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measurement device (or at least its detecting part) upside down .4 In this set-
ting where we represent outcomes as states, the assignment of an outcome can
now be envisioned as a true change of state fe,λ : Σ→ Σ (⊇ Oe) : p 7→ ϕe(p, λ) ,
as such allowing to describe the behavior of the system under concatenated
measurements.
ii. Projective symmetries : For non-degenerated quantum measurements, the
outcomes require representation by higher dimensional subspaces so identifica-
tion in terms of states now requires an injective map B(Oe) → P(P(Σ)) . The
behavior of states of the system under concatenated measurements then requires
specification of a family of “projectors” {piT : Σ→ T |T ∈ Oe} , e.g., the orthog-
onal projectors piA : Σ → A : p 7→ A ∧ (p ∨ A
⊥) on the corresponding subspace
A in quantum theory. The above discussed non-degenerated case fits also in
this picture by setting Oe ⊆
{
{p}
∣∣ p ∈ Σ} where now each pi{p} : Σ → {p} is
uniquely determined (having a singleton codomain).
iii. Orthosymmetries : The existence of an orthocomplementation on the lattice
of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space provides a dichotomic representation for
measurements which can be envisioned as a pair consisting of a (to be verified)
proposition α and its negation ¬α , in quantum theory yielding pi¬A : Σ→ A
⊥ :
p 7→ A⊥ ∧ (p ∨A) . In terms of linear operator calculus we have pi¬A = 1− piA ,
both of them being orthogonal projectors.
4 REPRESENTING QUANTUM HISTORY THEORY
Although quantum history theory involves sequential measurements, one of its
goals is to remain an essentially dichotomic propositional theory. This is for-
mally encoded in a rigid way in the “History Projection Operator”-approach
[14]. The key idea here is that the form of logicality aimed at in [14] repre-
sents faithfully in the Hilbert space tensor product.5 Let A := (αti)i be a
(so-called homogeneous) quantum history proposition with temporal support
(t1, t2, . . . , tn) . Then, rather than representing this as a sequence of subspaces
(Ai)i or projectors (pii)i we will either represent A as a pure tensor ⊗iAi in the
lattice of closed subspaces of the tensor product of the corresponding Hilbert
spaces or as the orthogonal projector ⊗ipii on this subspace. The crucial prop-
erty of this representation is then that ¬A again encodes as a projector namely
4The attentive reader will note that it is at this point that we escape the so-called hidden
variable no-go theorems . They arise when trying to impose contextual symmetries within
the states of the system by requiring that values of observables are independent of the chosen
context, e.g., the proof of the Kochen-Specker theorem. Our newly introduced variable λ ∈ Λ
follows contextual manipulations in an obvious manner.
5At this point we mention that in the study of sequential phenomena in the axiomatic
quantum theory perspective on quantum logic, sequentiality and compoundness both turn
out to be specifications of a universal causal duality [10], as such providing a metaphysical
perspective on the use of tensor products both for the description of compound physical
systems and sequential processes.
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id−⊗ipii [14], clarifying the notations piA and pi¬A . Moreover, if {A
i}i is a set
of so-called disjoint history propositions, i.e., ⊗kA
i
k ⊥ ⊗kA
j
k for i 6= j , then, the
history proposition that expresses the disjunction of {Ai}i sensu [14] is exactly
encoded as the projector
∑
i⊗kpi
i
k . We get as such a kind of logical setting that
is still encoded in terms of projectors. Note that pi¬A is not of the form ⊗ipii but
of the form
∑
i⊗kpi
i
k breaking the structural symmetry between a proposition
and its negation in ordinary quantum theory .
We will now transcribe the observations in the two previous sections to this
setting in order to provide a contextual deterministic model for quantum history
theory with discretely originating probabilities. One could say that we will apply
a split picture in terms of Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg, namely we assume that on
the level of unitary evolution we apply the Heisenberg picture such that we can
fix notation without reference to this evolution, but for changes of state due to
measurement we will (obviously) express this in the state space. When encoding
outcomes in terms of states we need to consider n copies of Σ , encoding the
trajectories due to the measurements. In view of the considerations made above
it will be no surprise that we will consider these trajectories as of the form ⊗ipi
in the tensor product ⊗iΣi . This will require the introduction of the following
“pseudo-projector”:
• pi⊗A : Σ→ ⊗iΣi : p 7→ p
⊗
A := p⊗ pi1(p)⊗ . . .⊗ (pin−1 ◦ . . . ◦ pi1)(p) .
Setting Σ⊗A := pi
⊗
A[Σ] = {p
⊗
A|p ∈ Σ} then pi
⊗
A : Σ → Σ
⊗
A encodes a bijective
representation of Σ . Noting that Pp(A) := 〈 p
⊗
A |piA p
⊗
A 〉 is the probability
given by quantum theory to obtain A , we then set inductively for fixed λ ∈ N
that ϕA(p, λ) = A if and only if:
• 〈 p⊗A |piA p
⊗
A 〉 ≥
1
2λ
+
∑λ−1
i=1
δ
(
ϕA(p,i)
)
2i
and ϕA(p, λ) = ¬A otherwise . The outcome trajectories in case we obtain A
are then given in terms of initial states by (piA ◦ pi
⊗
A) : Σ → ⊗iAi . The value
λ ∈ N can be envisioned as follows. We assume it to be a number of contextual
events, either real or virtual depending on one’s taste, and we assume that, given
that some events already happened, the chance of a next one happening is equal
to the chance that it doesn’t happen, so we actually consider a finite number
of probabilistically balanced consecutive binary decisive processes where the
result of the previous one determines whether we actually will perform the next
one . Unitary symmetries are induced in the obvious way as tensored unitary
operators ⊗iUi . This model then produces the statistical behavior of quantum
history theory.
The breaking of the structural symmetry between a proposition and its
negation manifestates itself in the most explicit way in the sense that when
we have a determined outcome ¬A we don’t have a determined trajectory in
our model — obviously one could build a fully deterministic model that also
determines this by concatenation of individual deterministic models (one for
each element in the temporal support), but we feel that this would not be in
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accordance with the propositional flavor a history theory aims at. The nega-
tion ¬A is indeed cognitive and not ontological with respect to the actual ex-
ecuted physical procedure or, in other words, the system’s context, and one
cannot expect an ontological model to encode this in terms of a formal dual-
ity. Explicitly, ¬(A ⊗ B) can be written both as (H ⊗ ¬B) ⊕ (¬A ⊗ B) and
(¬A⊗H)⊕ (A⊗¬B) which clearly define different procedures with respect to
imposed change of state due to the measurement. Even more explicitly, set-
ting HPO({Hk}k) := {
∑
i⊗kA
i
k|A
i
k ∈ L(Hk),⊗kA
i
k ⊥ ⊗kA
j
k for i 6= j} for
L(Hk) the lattice of closed subspaces of Hk , the “ontologically faithful hull” of
HPO({Hk}k) consists then of all “ortho-ideals” OI
(
HPO({Hk}k)
)
:=
•
{
↓ [{⊗kA
i
k}i]
∣∣ Aik ∈ L(Hk),⊗kAik ⊥ ⊗kAjk for i 6= j}
where ↓ [−] assigns to a set of pure tensors all pure tensors in ⊗kHk that are
smaller than at least one in the given set, this with respect to the ordering in
L(⊗kHk) — the downset ↓ [−] construction makes OI
(
HPO({Hk}k)
)
inherit
the L(⊗kHk)-order as intersection. If a particular decomposition is specified as
an element of OI
(
HPO({Hk}k)
)
, what means full specification of the physi-
cal procedure where summation over different sequences of pure tensors is now
envisioned as choice of procedure, we can provide a deterministic contextual
model, the choice of procedure itself becoming an additional variable. Conclu-
sively, the HPO-setting “looses” part of the physical ontology that goes with an
operational perspective on quantum theory,6 and as such, if we want to provide
a deterministic representation for general inhomogeneous history propositions
sensu the one we obtained for the homogeneous ones, we formally need to restore
this part of the physical ontology, e.g. as OI
(
HPO({Hk}k)
)
.
5 FURTHER DISCUSSION
In this paper we didn’t provide an answer and we even didn’t pose a question.
We just provided a new way to think about things, slightly confronting the usual
consistency or decoherence perspective for history theories. Even if one does not
subscribe to the underlying deterministic nature of the model it still exhibits
what a minimal representation of the indeterministic ingredients can be, as such
representing it in a more tangible way. With respect to the non-existence of a
smallest representation, in view of other physical considerations it could be that
one of the constructible discrete models presents itself as the truly canonical
one, e.g., equilibrium or other thermodynamical considerations, metastatistical
ones, emerging from additional modelization.
6A choice that is motivated by the traditional consistent history setting and its interpre-
tation as well as by a particular semantical perspective on quantum logic as a whole.
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